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currency issue but also about Selgin´s and White´s agnostic attitude 
with respect to the desirable base money regime are at least threefold:
(a) Public Choice considerations:
A central bank which is capable of influencing the amount of 
credit expansion effectuated by the monetary system will not be 
immune from the actions and initiatives of pressure groups lobbying 
for the benefits accompanying such credit expansion. The benefits to 
be derived from credit expansion may tend to be relatively more 
concentrated, that is, directed towards identifiable groups, than the 
costs of credit expansion which may be largely diffused among the 
general public. Public choice analysis, especially Olson´s, has revealed 
that it is easier to form an interest group when the number of 
potential members is small than when the number is large. (Olson
1971) A central bank may thus typically face incentives to pursue 
goals other than the low inflation desired by the public; monetary 
authorities may be led to pursue a political agenda, contrary to the 
interests of the average citizen etc.
(b) The literature on Rules versus Discretion
In the wake of a number of contributions exploring the role of 
dynamic inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 
1983a, 1983b) the debate on monetary policy and the appropriate role 
of central banks has for decades been dominated by discussions 
concerning the relative desirability of rules versus discretion as 
different possible approaches. With reference to monetary policy, the 
general idea is rather straightforward: a central bank seeking to 
manipulate the economy into the best combination of inflation and 
unemployment through discretionary policy, may find out that its 
options are so limited that discretion turns out to be a trap, when it 
faces a public that understands the game.11
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may face incentives to deviate from such rules. Probably the most 
important contribution of the literature on time inconsistency has 
thus been to provide a theoretical framework for thinking formally 
about credibility issues, on the one hand, and about the role of 
institutions and political factors, on the other, in influencing policy 
choices. 
Second, to the extent dynamic inconsistency is important, 
models that help us to understand the incentives faced by policy-
makers and the nature of the decision problems they face are 
important for the normative task of designing policy-making 
institutions. In order to influence efforts at reform and redesign of 
society´s monetary institutions, monetary economists need models 
that help in understanding how institutional structures actually affect 
policy outcomes. From the perspective adopted here it will be noted 
that the proposals for reform of our monetary institutions which have 
resulted from this literature have nevertheless remained extremely 
limited.6
It is the great merit of Pascal Salin to have had the courage to 
push the analysis beyond the conventional boundaries. In an 
important critical note concerning Bennett T. McCallum (1988) and 
Alan S. Blinder (1988) Pascal Salin has pointed out that the usual 
ranking, even if it involves some useful distinctions such as the 
differences between simple rules and complex rules and the 
differences between rules concerning instruments and rules 
concerning outcomes, is actually a partial ordering of a wider class of 
possibilities.  In particular the more fundamental distinction is the 
distinction between rules of just conduct and commands, i.e., rules 
commanding a result.
Adding this distinction between rules of just conduct and rules 
imposing a result, the classification ought to be the following:
1 Rules of just conduct13
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produced to satisfy human needs, had the malinvestments not taken 
place, and had the monetary expansion not discoordinated the 
interdependent plans of market participants, is lost forever. Errors 
cannot be corrected costlessly.
Is this theory still relevant for the understanding of real-world 
events? Today´s economists generally accept that the factors 
underlying business cycles have a variety of origins, of both a 
demand- and a supply-related nature, but they also increasingly 
recognize that these may well include Austrian aspects. It may be that 
Austrian factors have become more important with the changes in the 
international financial system of the past twenty years. Increasingly 
mobile capital flows now quickly seek out investment projects that are 
perceived to provide the most attractive returns. The Japanese boom 
and bust of the 1980s and 1990s is an example of a recent cycle with 
Austrian characteristics. The upturn of this cycle was driven by strong 
expansions of money and credit, which fueled a level and direction of 
investment that was unsustainable. In the aftermath, businesses 
suffered from chronic overcapacity, and long-term declines in 
corporate profitability led to a sharp deterioration of banks´ loan 
portfolios. Moreover, the traditional Keynesian policy approach of 
demand stimulation was unsuccessful in bringing the economy out of 
recession. In fact repeated injections of liquidity by the Bank of Japan 
have worked to delay the necessary restructuring effort. (see also 
Oppers 2002) 
The previous considerations elucidate some of the reasons why 
some authors have considered that the theorists of the Chicago School 
are guilty of naiveté in ascribing to governments the desire and ability 
to administer a stable monetary policy under all circumstances. (see 
e.g. Huerta de Soto 2006, 735)  This naiveté was also apparent in 
Becker´s original 1956 paper in which he arrived at the conclusion
that a government monopoly of the currency issue is preferable to 
decentralization in banking and currency competition.17
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because they are familiar, and the practice of continuing to accept
them is self-reinforcing: it is not in any one trader´s self-interest to 
refuse them if he expects others to continue accepting them. 
But so what? One might conjecture that the regression theorem 
does not entail that a fiat money, once in existence, cannot go on to 
exist for extended or even very long periods of time - although 
probably at an ever-depreciating value - even without constant further 
government intervention. In this respect there seems to have arisen 
an extensive as well as a more restrictive interpretation of the 
implications of the regression theorem. According to one interpretation 
a deeper implication of the regression theorem points to an essential 
incompatibility between the unhampered market and fiat money. 
According to this view one can seriously doubt whether conceivably a 
fiat money could survive for extended periods of time on the 
unhampered market without constant further protection by further 
interventionism. 
This can be explained as follows. Commodity money enjoys a 
crucial competitive advantage over fiat money: commodity money is 
also used outside of indirect exchange. The fact that commodity 
money always commands a price on the market irrespective of how 
widespread it is used as money, provides a kind of insurance for the 
owners of commodity money: the purchasing power of their money 
never falls to zero because there will always be a non-monetary 
demand for it. Even if commodity money falls temporarily out of use 
as money, it can always spontaneously re-emerge as a medium of 
exchange, since market participants can rely on its present non-
monetary market prices to speculate about its future purchasing 
power.
Fiat money to the contrary has by definition no other than 
monetary uses. If the demand for it fades away so that it is even 
momentarily driven out of circulation, it disappears forever; it can 
never be re-introduced again on the market because there are no 30
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